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Managing ethnic diversity in Georgia: one step forward, two steps back
Jonathan Wheatley
Centre for Democracy Aarau, University of Zurich, Switzerland
This article attempts to explain how the Georgian state sought to manage ethnic diversity at
the same time as (re-)building state institutions within a (nominally) democratic framework,
from the collapse of Soviet power to the present day. It is suggested that the explanation for
the slow and uneven progress in accommodating national minorities within the Georgian state
derives from four principal factors: first, the collapse of the Soviet state and the consequent
inability of the newly independent state to provide basic public goods; second, the lack of
a ‘civic’ model for the accommodation of minorities; third, the continuation of the Soviet
norm of arbitrary exercise of power by leaders, which is ill-suited to accommodating
diversity and resolving conflict; and, finally, the Soviet legacy of ethnofederalism, which
carved out three autonomous territories – Abkhazia, Achara and South Ossetia – from
within Georgia that would (violently, in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) resist the
encroachments of the new Georgian state, and would later (in the case of South Ossetia)
provide a pretext for military conflict between Russia and Georgia.
Keywords: Ethnofederalism; state-building; nation-building; democratization; institutions
Introduction
Central to the discussion on managing ethnic diversity in Georgia are three interrelated processes
that have set the parameters for transformation in most former Soviet republics. These are: state
building, nation building and democratization. State building is the establishment of the state’s
capacity to exercise what is referred to here as the ‘core functions of statehood’. These include a
monopoly over violence, the provision of public goods (such as education, healthcare, pensions
and basic infrastructure maintenance), and the establishment of a set of institutions that can
defuse and process potential conflicts that result from divergent interests within society.
These institutions, which include courts, economic regulations and (in democracies) elections
and referendums, can be subsumed under the broad rubric of ‘rule of law’.
Nation building refers to the development of an ‘imagined community’ or ‘demos’ to which
citizens feel they belong and with which they identify (Anderson 1991). National communities
can exist without states, but more often there is a close link between the nation and the state.
First, the goal of most nationalisms, in which the national community lacks its own state, is inde-
pendent statehood. Once independent statehood has been achieved (as was the case for the suc-
cessor states of the former Soviet Union in 1991), the goal is to persuade or cajole all citizens
living within the territory of the state to identify with that state, and to perceive as legitimate
the laws and institutions it imposes. Here, the new state’s capacity to exercise its ‘core functions’
plays a role; if the state is unable to provide security, the rule of law, or basic public goods to
those whose loyalty towards it is already less than certain, its chances of establishing a ‘national
community’ or ‘demos’ will be low indeed.
Democracy and democratization form the third element of the triad, which is also linked
inextricably with the first two elements. First, democracy is commonly associated with the
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rule of law: although the rule of law is not a prerequisite for democracy, stable democracies
rarely exist without it. Non-democratic regimes in which the rule of law is weak are often
prone to state weakness and collapse. This can happen when the conflict-processing institutions
are ineffective, and conflict resolution depends instead on the arbitrary decision-making power
of the executive. In such cases, the coherence of the state itself can be threatened if the leadership
falls from power. Similarly, if the state is to be successful in establishing its own institutions to
regulate conflicts of interests within society, the population must perceive these institutions as
legitimate, and democracy is widely seen as the most effective way of providing legitimacy.
This article examines how this triadic relationship of state, nation and democracy has func-
tioned in Georgia since the country’s independence. The article first considers the legacy of
Soviet rule in terms of the ethnofederal structure of the USSR and the Soviet conceptualization
of the nation. It then turns to the Georgian case, and examines how ethnic tensions came to the
fore during the short-lived presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The following section focuses on
the return of former Georgian Communist Party boss, Eduard Shevardnadze, and how the
(partial) restoration of state authority affected the management of diversity, both in terms of
the relationship between Georgians and minorities, and in terms of the relationship between
the central state and the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The final
section turns to the most recent period following the ostensibly ‘democratic’ Rose Revolution,
in which the new president, Mikheil Saakashvili, attempted to re-establish state authority by
restoring central control over the breakaway territories and integrating minorities into Georgian
public life.
The Soviet legacy
The Soviet state was based on the principle of ethnofederalism. According to this principle, the
USSR was divided territorially into a hierarchical system of administrative units and sub-units –
union republics, autonomous republics, autonomous okrugs and autonomous oblasts – each of
which was supposed to represent a ‘homeland’ for a particular nationality, or (in rare cases) a
religious group. Within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), there were two auton-
omous republics (Abkhazia and Achara) and one autonomous oblast (South Ossetia). The 15
union republics alone enjoyed the formal right to secede from the USSR, although this was
not a feasible scenario until the very last days of Communist rule. By 1990, there were also
20 autonomous republics, 10 autonomous okrugs and eight autonomous oblasts. The Soviet
state collapsed along the fault-lines of this federal structure as all 15 union republics became
independent, and many of the sub-units (autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts)
began demanding greater autonomy from their union republics.
The ideological conception of the Georgian national community was heavily influenced by
the legacy of Soviet ethnofederalism. Not only was the USSR divided territorially, but each indi-
vidual was also classified according to his or her nationality, irrespective of the territorial div-
ision in which he or she lived, and the nationality would be registered in his or her passport.
Nationality was a legal category that was recorded in most bureaucratic transactions and even
affected where one could live and work (Brubaker 1996). Thus, under the Soviet Union, there
was a territory referred to as the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and a Georgian nationality,
but no notion of a ‘citizen of the republic of Georgia’ as an official category. This would make
the establishment of a civic (non-ethnic) national identity problematic.
The Soviet conception of ‘nationality’ relied heavily on the concepts of eighteenth and
nineteenth century German romanticism, and was based on the premise that a nation was
somehow a primordial entity, objectively definable and independent of the self-perception of
its members.1 According to this Soviet ‘primordialist’ concept of nationhood, language was
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the primary determinant of nationality, with cultural and religious factors of secondary, although
still significant, importance. This idea of a primordial nation with its own language, history and
territory translated itself into a perception that the nation had inalienable rights over certain
territories, a right that other nations did not enjoy. As the Soviet Union collapsed, heated disputes
broke out between the elites of various national groups over who had ‘owned’ a particular
territory during remote historical periods. Once again, this undermined any possibility of devel-
oping any type of non-ethnic citizenship in which the rights of all groups to a particular territory
would be respected.
The notion of citizenship was, in any case, weak in the USSR. The rulers based state auth-
ority on the arbitrary exercise of power over the ruled. The concept of the ‘dictatorship of the
proletariat’, as formulated by Lenin and Stalin, was the ‘rule – unrestricted by law and based
on force – of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie’ (Jowitt 1992, p. 66). While the principle of
arbitrary repression reached its apogee during the purges of the late 1930s, and later (from
the Khrushchev period onward) began to dwindle, the fulfilment of goals took precedence
over the rule of law throughout the Soviet period. On paper, the Soviet Constitution was rela-
tively liberal, and included far-reaching individual rights (including freedom of conscience,
the right to profess any religion and to conduct religious worship, the right to privacy, and
freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work), as well as the formal right of union republics
to secede (see above). However, these rights were not observed in practice, and were countered
by other constitutionally stipulated ‘duties’ to the centre. In reality, individual rights were sub-
ordinate to the arbitrary power of Communist Party leaders, while any discussion of secession
from the USSR was strictly prohibited.
Paradoxically, Georgian nation-builders today define their nation in terms of the borders of
the territorial entity that used to be the Georgian SSR – the very entity that modern Georgian
nationalists deny was ‘national’. With the exception of the short-lived independent social demo-
cratic republic of Georgia (1918–1921), there has been no other modern blueprint of a state or
state-like entity that Georgia can draw from. Although it forms the basis for the foundational
myth of modern Georgian nationalism, the medieval kingdom of Georgia was not a modern
state in any shape or form. Even the most fervent Georgian nationalists cannot claim the imperial
lands of medieval Georgian Queen Tamar (reigned 1184–1213) for modern Georgia. Many of
these territories now sit within Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Only the legacy of the Soviet
republic provides the legal justification for the continued incorporation of the disputed territories
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into the rest of Georgia.
The rise of Gamsakhurdia
At the end of the Soviet period, Georgia was an ethnically diverse republic (see Table 1) that
contained within its territorial structure two autonomous republics (Abkhazia and Achara)
and one autonomous oblast (South Ossetia). During the early Soviet period, Abkhazia and
South Ossetia had acquired autonomous status because they were deemed to be the homeland
of two distinct nationalities, Abkhazian and Ossetian, while Achara had attained its status of
autonomous republic because much of its population was Muslim (as a result of a long period
under Ottoman rule), even though it was mainly populated by ethnic Georgians.
The practice of identifying oneself with a national group that ostensibly enjoys certain
inalienable rights combined with a weak notion of citizenship very much shaped the philosophy
of late twentieth-century Georgian nationalism. By the late 1980s, an ethnocentric discourse
dominated Georgian historiography, even within the official (Communist) intelligentsia.
According to this ethnocentric version of history, neither the Abkhazians nor the Ossetians
were indigenous to Georgia (Lortkipanidze 1990).2 Therefore, as ‘guests’ in the country,
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neither group should be entitled to the same rights as the titular nationality. It was this discourse
that was adopted and championed by Georgian nationalists, with disastrous consequences.
Ethnic tensions in Georgia began to rise in the late 1980s as not only former dissidents but
also members of the official intelligentsia began to press for greater autonomy for Georgia within
the USSR, and, later, full independence. The push towards independence was led by former dis-
sidents, most notably Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Merab Kostava and Giorgi Chanturia and, following
the deaths of 20 demonstrators – mainly women and girls – at the hands of Soviet Interior Min-
istry troops on 9 April 1989, the mood of virtually the entire Georgian population swung firmly
behind independence (Beissinger 2002, p. 185).3 In an effort to catch up with the new mood,
even the Georgian Communist Party became increasingly anxious to portray itself as a defender
of Georgian national interests. In November 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR offi-
cially condemned the Soviet annexation of Georgia in 1921. In March 1990, the same body
passed a declaration of sovereignty and announced that it considered illegal the 1922 pact on
the basis of which the USSR was formed (Wheatley 2005, p. 51, Zuercher 2005, p. 90).
These moves provoked alarm amongst ethnic minorities, especially since the rhetoric of the
most prominent and popular opposition leader, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was characterized by
ethnic chauvinism, and was often directed against ‘ungrateful minorities’, whom he saw as an
obstacle to the creation of an independent Georgian state. During 1989, pressure on ethnic min-
orities increased, and culminated in the expulsion of ethnic Azerbaijanis from the town of
Bolnisi. However, the greatest disquiet was felt in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
where local political elites feared losing all power in the event of Georgian independence.
Here, ethnicity and nationalism was used by the elites of the two autonomous regions as a
resource for mobilizing the ethnic Abkhazian and Ossetian populations. Abandoned by the
centre as the USSR collapsed, these elites fought hard to preserve their power-base, and
found themselves in a fierce power struggle with the nationalist elites in Tbilisi.
In Abkhazia, the local political elite was predominantly Abkhazian (Cvetkovski undated;
Tsikhelashvili 2001),4 even though numerically the Abkhazian population of Abkhazia was con-
siderably smaller than the Georgian population (17.8% compared to 45.7%). This imbalance
made the Abkhazian elite view the collapse of centralized power in Moscow, and steps
towards democratization, with increasing alarm, as Georgian independence threatened to
deprive them of their dominant position in ‘their’ autonomous republic. In July 1989, a
violent episode broke out in the Abkhazian capital, Sukhum/Sokhumi,5 as a result of a decision
by the Georgian Council of Ministers to permit the establishment of a Georgian-language
affiliate of Tbilisi State University there. The violence led to the deaths of several people and
significantly increased tensions between Tbilisi and Sukhum/Sokhumi.
Table 1. National composition in Georgia, 1989 and 2002.
Georgians
(%)
Abkhazians
(%)
Ossetians
(%)
Armenians
(%)
Azerbaijanis
(%)
Russians
(%)
Others
(%)
Georgia Total 2002 83.75 0.08 0.87 5.69 6.51 1.55 1.54
Georgia Total 1989 70.13 1.77 3.04 8.10 5.69 6.32 4.95
Achara 2002 93.38 0.41 0.06 2.35 0.14 2.41 1.24
Achara 1989 82.77 0.42 0.21 4.04 0.27 7.66 4.64
Abkhazia 1989 45.68 17.76 0.22 14.58 0.10 14.27 7.39
S. Ossetia 1989 28.97 0.01 66.21 1.00 0.04 2.16 1.62
Source: Population censuses from 1989 and 2002. The 2002 survey includes neither Abkhazia, except for the Kodori
Gorge, or those parts of the former autonomous oblast of South Ossetia that were outside the control of the Georgian
government.
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Following the victory of Gamsakhurdia’s ‘Round Table–Free Georgia’ bloc in elections to
the Georgian Supreme Soviet in October 1990, in which all ethnically-based parties were disal-
lowed, including Abkhazian and Ossetian political parties, it was South Ossetia that provided the
first major flashpoint. In September 1990, the South Ossetian regional Soviet had declared South
Ossetia an independent republic within the USSR and on 11 December the Georgian Supreme
Soviet annulled this declaration, abolished the oblast’s autonomous status, and made it part of
another Georgian region. The direct result of these actions was 18 months of civil war within
the region of South Ossetia, leading to hundreds of deaths and the expulsion of thousands –
both Georgians and Ossetians – from their homes. Hostilities continued until a joint peacekeep-
ing force of Georgians, Russians and Ossetians took control in July 1992. A mainly Ossetian
government was established in the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinval/i, and Tbilisi lost
control over most of what had been the South Ossetian autonomous oblast.
The return of Shevardnadze
Eventually, Gamsakhurdia’s demagogic and confrontational style of leadership alienated not
only his enemies but also his closest supporters. In January 1992, he was finally forced out in
a military coup led by an unlikely coalition of former communist nomenklatura, paramilitary
leaders and liberal intelligentsia. Although former Communist Party boss Eduard Shevardnadze
returned to Georgia in March 1992, to chair a newly established governing body called the State
Council, real power rested with two paramilitary leaders: Tengiz Kitovani, Gamsakhurdia’s
former defence minister, and Jaba Ioseliani, a charismatic bank robber-turned-theatre critic
who led a patriotic military formation called the Mkhedrioni (Horsemen).
Shevardnadze had yet to impose his authority on the various disparate and often armed fac-
tions when new hostilities broke out in Abkhazia. The immediate catalyst for the conflict was a
decision taken in August 1992 by Kitovani to move his troops into Abkhazia beyond the juris-
diction set by Shevardnadze, supposedly to secure the roads and railways and to crush an armed
uprising by Gamsakhurdia’s supporters in western Georgia. In September 1993, after 13 months
of war in which at least 10,000 people from both sides were killed, Abkhazian troops supported
by Russian irregular forces retook the city of Sukhum/Sokhumi and expelled more than 200,000
ethnic Georgians from the territory of Abkhazia. Henceforth, Abkhazia would be under the
control of a separatist government and would remain outside the Georgian government’s
sphere of influence.
The central state’s control over other parts of Georgia was also weak. The former auton-
omous republic of Achara, despite remaining peaceful, fell under the control of a local potentate,
Aslan Abashidze, who had originally been appointed by Gamsakhurdia, and remained imper-
vious to influence from the centre. Meanwhile, much of the western region of Samegrelo was
under the sway of armed supporters of the deposed president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Finally,
those areas that were inhabited mainly by ethnic minorities also had little to do with the new
state. Until 1993 the mainly Armenian southern region of Javakheti (the districts of Akhalkalaki
and Ninotsminda) was under the control of a local ethnic Armenian self-help organization called
Javakh, while the southeastern region of Kvemo Kartli, which was home to a large Azerbaijani
population, was ruled by a number of Georgian and Azerbaijani criminal gangs that carried out
smuggling activities along the main roads leading to Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Thus, in the early 1990s Georgia was marked by total chaos and lawlessness. More than
almost anywhere else in the former Soviet Union, with the exception of war-ravaged Tajikistan,
the new state proved utterly incapable of executing its core functions. Crime was rife as armed
gangs systematically looted private and state property and real power rested with paramilitary
groupings, the most powerful of which were Kitovani’s National Guard and the Mkhedrioni.
Central Asian Survey 123
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Both organizations were heavily-armed mafia-type militias that resorted to extortion and theft
to obtain resources. The economy went into a nosedive: according to official figures, GDP
fell by 15.0% in 1990, by 20.1% in 1991, by 44.2% in 1992, by 29.3% in 1993 and by 11.0%
in 1994.
During 1994 and 1995, Shevardnadze began to take on the paramilitary groups and restored
some semblance of state authority. He did so by rebuilding Georgia’s police force, which he
himself had headed during his time as Georgian Interior Minister from 1965 to 1972, and by
using this force to gradually undermine the paramilitaries. At times he was forced to co-opt
members of the paramilitary gangs into the police, but at least in this way he was able to intro-
duce some degree of centralized control. By the end of 1993 he had defeated Gamsakhurdia’s
supporters in western Georgia. Tengiz Kitovani was arrested in January 1995, after leading a
faction of some 1000 lightly-armed supporters in a quixotic attempt to retake Abkhazia. Ioseliani
was also arrested following an assassination attempt against Shevardnadze in August 1995. By
the end of 1995, the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni had been effectively neutralized.
However, the dire economic situation still made the establishment of a well-functioning state
highly problematic. Despite a marked reduction in armed conflict and a reassertion of central
authority in most areas of Georgia – with the exception of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and (in
part) Achara – pervasive official corruption undermined the state’s ability to exercise its core
functions. This was the result both of economic collapse, which obliged the Georgian leadership
to re-establish order with the minimum of resources, and of the ingrained bureaucratic culture of
Shevardnadze’s political elite, most members of which had a history of service in Communist
Party structures. This culture was marked by rule-breaking, clientelism and outright corruption,
as well as by the accumulation of private resources at the expense of providing public goods for
society.
Overall, the state did not provide public goods. Instead, it supplied ‘network goods’, whereby
state goods and services were provided only to those who were part of a particular personalized
network that linked them to an individual in a position of state power. In some areas, especially
rural areas and areas in which national minorities were concentrated, few people had access to
these networks. As a result, they became almost entirely disengaged from the public sphere and
were forced to find subsistence by living off the land and using up their previous savings. This
undermined the legitimacy of the Georgian state in the eyes of many inhabitants of Georgia,
especially those who did not belong to the ‘titular nationality’.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia under Shevardnadze
The dysfunctional nature of the Georgian state and the recent history of armed conflict provided
little incentive for the breakaway enclaves to re-integrate into Georgia. In Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, it was widely believed (not without reason) that the goal of the Georgian side was
nothing less than their total absorption into Georgia. Within these enclaves, Georgia was there-
fore viewed as the enemy, and the main debate was whether to aim for full independence or
whether to opt instead for some form of autonomy within the Russian Federation (RF). In
general, the Abkhazian political and intellectual elite favoured the first option, although some
Abkhazian NGO leaders and politicians argued that Abkhazia should be incorporated as an
associate member of the RF (Anjaparidze 2005). In South Ossetia, the emphasis was on unifica-
tion with North Ossetia, which was a part of the RF and, as a result, the South Ossetian leadership
at times lobbied actively for the full integration of South Ossetia into Russia. In both cases,
re-integration into Georgia was considered anathema to the national interest.
Although neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia were recognized as independent states, both
enclaves received economic and political support from Russia. Although Russia, together with
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other states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), had imposed a naval and
economic blockade on Abkhazia in 1996 in response to perceived Abkhazian intransigence in
negotiations with Georgia, this blockade was short-lived. Already in 2000 restrictions on
freedom of movement of adult men were lifted and residents of Abkhazia could cross the
border into the Russian Federation. By 2002, Russian businessmen began investing in Abkhazia
and in December 2002 the rail link between Sukhum/Sokhumi and the Russian city of Sochi was
opened. Meanwhile, South Ossetia was a major recipient of Russian humanitarian aid and was far
more integrated with the North Ossetian and Russian economic space than with Georgia. In 2002,
Russia began issuing passports to the population of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is estimated
that 80% of Abkhazians had received Russian passports by 2005 (German 2006), and it is prob-
able that a similar statistic applied to residents of the breakaway zones of South Ossetia. This
further cemented the already powerful links between the two enclaves and the Russian Federation.
Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
could be described as ‘frozen conflicts’, which remained unresolved despite the near absence
of violent conflict.6 One reason for this state of affairs was that it was to the advantage of power-
ful factions on all sides to maintain the status quo. Both the elites of the breakaway regions and
many Georgian officials took advantage of the porous ‘borders’ between the de facto separatist
regimes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia to engage in, or protect, smug-
gling. From 1998 onwards, contraband trade grew very rapidly and smuggling was the one
activity that brought together ‘entrepreneurs’ from two mutually hostile communities. Contra-
band cigarettes, petrol, scrap iron, stolen cars and hazelnuts were habitually smuggled across
the so-called ceasefire line (monitored by UN military observers) from Abkhazia into Samegrelo
(Mingrelia), while all types of contraband goods, especially flour, petrol and alcohol flowed into
the Shida Kartli region via the Ergneti market in Tskhinval/i (Chikhladze 2001, Kukhianidze
et al. 2003). In both cases, this smuggling was the result of co-operation between criminal group-
ings from opposing sides of the ethnic divide, law enforcement officers and, at times, Russian
peacekeepers (Kukhianidze et al. 2003, Shonia 2003). Often these groups had close links
with the top leadership in both Georgia and the breakaway regions, and it must be questioned
whether these political and economic elites were genuinely interested in a comprehensive settle-
ment for these ‘frozen conflicts’.
National minorities under Shevardnadze
Within ‘Georgia proper’, i.e. outside the two breakaway regions, there remained a significant
proportion of non-Georgians, even though this proportion was lower than it had been during
the Soviet period (see Table 1). While previously the Georgian SSR had been a multi-lingual
community, with Russian recognized as the language of inter-ethnic communication, the
newly independent Georgia was now a monolingual state, with most bureaucratic transactions
carried out in Georgian and nearly all media using only this language. The use of Russian in
public life declined as the ethnic Russian population dwindled (see Table 1), and young Geor-
gians no longer found it either expedient or fashionable to learn the language of the former
imperial power. Increasingly, the language barrier became a barrier to participation in public
life, and minorities became more and more socially and culturally isolated. Nowhere was this
more so than in the rural provinces of Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli, where knowledge
of Georgian was low and the state infrastructure weak.
Javakheti region (consisting of Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda districts) is home to an Arme-
nian population, who make up over 90% of the local population. Armenians also make up a little
less than half the population in Akhaltsikhe district (also in Samtskhe-Javakheti province) and in
Tsalka district (in Kvemo Kartli province). Azerbaijanis make up a majority in three districts of
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Kvemo Kartli province (Marneuli, Dmanisi and Bolnisi districts) and nearly half the population
in a fourth (Gardabani). These non-Georgian population groups have traditionally been better
integrated in the social, cultural and economic life of their kin states than within that of their
home state, Georgia. Unable, for the most part, to speak or read Georgian, they have little
knowledge either of Georgian political life or even of their own rights and responsibilities
under Georgian law. For educational text books, as well as for news and media, they have
turned either to their kin-states of Armenia and Azerbaijan or to Russia, and have frequently
travelled to their kin states to attend university and to Russia for work.
For its part, the Georgian state under Shevardnadze had little interest in integrating national
minorities in these rather remote districts of Georgia.7 The language barrier increasingly became
an obstacle to communication between Georgians and minority groups, especially amongst
young people, as Russian began to lose its role as the language of inter-ethnic communication.
The youth, especially the Georgian youth, could no longer speak Russian fluently enough to
communicate. Programmes to teach the Georgian language to ethnic minorities were half-
hearted, mainly due to the state’s incapacity to implement its education policy. Communications
were made even more complex due to the declining infrastructure, and poor provision of public
goods further undermined prospects for integration. School buildings collapsed and some
regions, especially Javakheti and Tsalka district, became virtually cut off from the rest of the
country as the parlous state of the roads made journeys to the Georgian capital, Tbilisi,
arduous. In terms of the provision of public goods, regions in which minorities were concen-
trated were not necessarily worse off than other remote rural districts, but linguistic barriers
reinforced a sense of isolation and neglect.
In Javakheti, it was not the Georgian state that provided public goods to the local population,
but the 62nd Divisional Russian base located in the town of Akhalkalaki. This military base pro-
vided employment and a source of living to many local families. The presence of the base meant
that the currency circulating in the region was the Russian rouble, rather than the Georgian lari,
which further distanced Javakheti from the rest of Georgia. The base also provided psychologi-
cal reassurance as a guarantee of defence against neighbouring Turkey.8 Therefore, plans by the
Georgian government to close the base were fiercely resisted by the local population.
Meanwhile, the Georgian state ruled over Javakheti indirectly, by co-opting local Armenians
to top positions in the local apparat. Typically, these were businessmen who had profited from
Georgia’s status as a ‘neutral’ state in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to engage in the trade of oil
and gas between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Some had previously been part of the Javakh move-
ment. While enjoying considerable authority in Javakheti, these leaders were themselves poorly
integrated into the Georgian state and were linked to the state leadership by informal ties, rather
than by their influence over state decision making.
In Kvemo Kartli, the Azerbaijani population was barely represented in state structures at all.
In the late 1980s, most Azerbaijanis holding top positions in local power structures were
removed from their posts as a result of the new mood of ethnic nationalism that had swept
the country. During Shevardnadze’s term as president (1995–2003), all heads of the rayon (dis-
trict) administration (gamgebelis) in Kvemo Kartli were Georgians (unlike in Javakheti, where
these posts were held by Armenians), and virtually all other senior posts at rayon level were also
held by Georgians. Local Azerbaijani leaders were given minor posts but, more importantly,
were allowed to engage in corruption in return for their loyalty to Kvemo Kartli’s powerful gov-
ernor, Levan Mamaladze. As a result, there were few mechanisms for the local Azerbaijani
population to express their grievances, the most pressing of which was corruption in the
process of land distribution following the dissolution of the communist-era collective farms
(sovkhozes and kolkhozes). Much of the land that had formerly belonged to sovkhozes and
kolkhozes was leased out in a non-transparent manner. Very often the bulk of this land was
126 J. Wheatley
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [F
ac
hh
oc
hs
ch
ule
 N
or
dw
es
tsc
hw
eiz
] a
t 0
3:0
3 0
4 J
uly
 20
14
 
rented by ‘local notables’, typically former sovkhoz or kolkhoz directors or individuals with close
personal links to members of the local administration. Most, although not all, of these individ-
uals were Georgians. This added to the impression amongst many local Azerbaijanis that they
were second-class citizens who did not really belong in the Georgian state.
The Rose Revolution and its aftermath
It was the Georgian state’s incapacity to provide the basic core functions of statehood that
fuelled the public disillusionment that brought about the non-violent overthrow of Shevard-
nadze’s government, in what became known as the Rose Revolution, in November 2003. The
new government, under President Mikheil Saakashvili, aimed to remedy the situation by increas-
ing the power of the state and making it more visible throughout the country. Above all, Saakash-
vili’s government sought to eradicate enclaves – geographical, economic and cultural – that had
hitherto appeared beyond the reach of the state. Economically, this meant cracking down on cor-
ruption and increasing budgetary revenues with a view to increasing the supply of public goods.
Politically, it meant reintegrating the country by bringing Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Achara
back under the control of the central government and integrating national minorities into the pol-
itical and cultural life of Georgia.
At the outset of his presidency, Saakashvili made it clear that the restoration of Georgia’s
territorial integrity was his top priority. Travelling to the tomb of the eleventh-century Georgian
king David Aghmashenebeli (‘the Builder’, credited with uniting the medieval Georgian state) on
the day before his inauguration, Saakashvili promised to consolidate the Georgian state and to
bring the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia back under Georgian sovereignty.
In a number of ways Saakashvili was rather successful in strengthening the Georgian state.
He significantly reduced corruption by abolishing the notoriously corrupt traffic police, and by
arresting a number of high profile politicians and businessmen for graft. The fiscal capacity of
the state grew; tax revenues rose from 15.0% of GDP in 2003 to 25.8% in 2007.9 As a result,
significant improvements were made to Georgia’s energy and transport infrastructure. Roads
were repaired in Tbilisi and in many rural areas, and 24-hour electricity – virtually unknown
during the Shevardnadze period – was the norm throughout the country by 2006, including in
remote rural areas and those in which national minorities were concentrated.
Initially, the new government’s campaign to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity also met
with some success. On 6 May 2004, the Acharan leader Aslan Abashidze was forced from
office as a result of peaceful protests in much the same way as his old rival (and later ally) She-
vardnadze had been six months previously. While never formally demanding autonomy from
Georgia, Abashidze had ruled the former autonomous region as his personal fiefdom for the
past 13 years; now Achara was brought back under the full control of the state.
However, these two notable successes would mark the limit of Saakashvili’s state-building
achievements. The problem was that state building in Georgia was carried out in time-honoured
tradition, i.e. by means of coercion, rather than by establishing reliable institutions that link
together the state and civil society, and provide checks and balances against abuse of authority
by the executive. The fight against corruption was waged using the strong arm of the law, while
armed force was seen as indispensable to restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity. From the
outset, the government embarked on massive increases in military spending. Having made up
just 0.7% of GDP in 2003, defence spending in Georgia made up 8.8% of GDP in 2007 according
to IMF statistics.10 In the words of Mann, Saakashvili’s new state was based on ‘despotic power’
rather than ‘infrastructural power’ (Mann 1994).
Despite the ostensibly ‘democratic’ nature of the Rose Revolution, state power came to rest
with a narrow circle of Saakashvili’s close associates11 and was propagated by means of a ‘party
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of power’ – the United National Movement. This party was highly centralized and depended
fully on the patronage of the presidency for its existence in very much the same way as Shevard-
nadze’s ‘party of power’ – the Citizens’ Union of Georgia – had done beforehand. Both struc-
tures resembled the old Communist Party in organizational terms and were based on the
principles of ‘democratic centralism’, i.e. decision-making power was vested in the leadership
alone. Within this system, decisions were taken arbitrarily without consultation either with
civil society or with other political forces. This often led to ill-thought out decisions that under-
mined the success of the state-building project.
This project began to unravel as early as 2004. Buoyed by his success in Achara, Saakashvili
turned his attention to South Ossetia. In order to win over the South Ossetian people, he
attempted to employ very much the same tactics that he had successfully used in Achara; he sup-
plied free fertilizers to the rural population and promised full state pensions to Ossetian citizens
in order to mobilize the people against the separatist government. However, as well as a carrot,
Saakashvili also wielded a stick. In early June, the Georgian side closed down the Ergneti market
on the ‘border’ between South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia, which was a major trading point
for contraband goods between Georgia and Russia and, it was argued, a major source of enrich-
ment for the South Ossetian political elite.
However, this strategy backfired: the closure of the Ergneti market not only hit the South
Ossetian leadership, it also hit ordinary South Ossetian traders for whom the market was their
main source of livelihood. Tensions between Georgian and South Ossetian forces within the
enclave escalated, leading to six weeks of low-level fighting between the two sides, the
deaths of 17 Georgians and five Ossetians and the exodus of many civilians from their villages.
Although both sides eventually withdrew to their previous positions, the confrontation was
highly counter-productive to the Georgian government’s long-term aims. While previously
Ossetians and Georgians had mixed and traded with one another, particularly in the Ergneti
Market, after the summer of 2004 virtually all of these contacts stopped. Both the Ossetian popu-
lation and the population of ethnically Georgian villages within South Ossetia developed a ‘siege
mentality’, characterized by deep distrust of the other side. Russia was seen as the defender of
South Ossetian interests and posters of Russian president Vladimir Putin were displayed in the
streets of Tskhinval/i. Now more than ever, the South Ossetian leadership and the Ossetian
population were united in a desire for unification with Russia and were encouraged in their
aspirations by the government of the Russian Federation. The Georgian initiative had been an
unmitigated failure.
In July 2006, tensions escalated between Tbilisi and Abkhazia over the Upper Kodori Gorge
in the east of Abkhazia. This tiny enclave had a predominantly Svan population (a linguistic sub-
group of Georgians) and had been under the control of local militia leader, Emzar Kvitsiani,
since the mid-1990s, who was nominally loyal to Tbilisi, but ran the enclave more or less as
he saw fit. Following an announcement by Kvitsiani that he was rearming his militia and
would resist all attempts of the government to bring his enclave under central control, the
Georgian government responded by sending troops to the region and forced Kvitsiani to flee.
In what was seen as a major provocation by the de facto authorities in Abkhazia, the Georgian
government decided to turn the Upper Kodori Gorge into a temporary administrative centre
and to move the headquarters of the Abkhazian government-in-exile to the gorge, leading to
an angry reaction from the Abkhazian and Russian sides.
While repeatedly stressing that it was only intending to use peaceful means to restore Geor-
gia’s territorial integrity, and bring South Ossetia and Abkhazia back under effective Georgian
sovereignty, events on the ground suggested that Georgia was also considering the military
option. A part-time territorial army was established, and Georgia pointedly refused to sign a
guarantee on the non-use of force, which was a key demand of the separatists as a pre-condition
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for negotiations. On 17 March 2008, the head of the parliamentary committee on security and
defence, Givi Tagamadze, a member of Saakashvili’s inner circle, even suggested that if diplo-
macy proved ineffective, Georgia was ready to restore its territorial integrity with the help of the
armed forces.12
This determination on the part of the Georgian side to restore the country’s territorial integ-
rity went hand in hand with an equally strong determination on the part of Russia to maintain its
influence over Georgia and the Caucasus region as a whole through its hold over the two break-
away entities. The Russian Federation now viewed events in Abkhazia as part of its own internal
affairs. During Saakashvili’s presidency, the national project of Georgia, on the one hand, and
that of the Russian Federation, on the other, became irreconcilable. This would lead to a total
breakdown in relations between the two countries. Russia clearly viewed its continued hege-
mony over Abkhazia and South Ossetia as central to its national security. On the other hand,
Georgia was equally determined to restore Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgian sovereignty,
and sought to build alliances with the United States and Western Europe in order to achieve this
aim.13 Relations between Russia and Georgia deteriorated progressively during 2004–2008 and
Russian imposed an economic blockade on Georgia in 2006.
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail the five-day war that broke out
between Russian and Georgia over South Ossetia in August 2008, which caused at least 600
deaths on both Georgian and South Ossetian sides and led to the temporary occupation by
Russian troops of broad swathes of Georgian territory. It would appear probable that the political
leadership in the Russian Federation had prepared for the eventuality of war in South Ossetia and
had made strategic military contingencies with this end in mind.14 In many ways, it would seem
that the Russian leadership goaded Saakashvili into launching a military assault on the enclave
so that Russia could subsequently reinforce its grip on both South Ossetia and Abhkazia.
However, most observers also agree that Saakashvili’s decision to launch a military attack on
Tskhinval/i on the night of 7 August was ill thought-out and foolhardy.15
Certainly, the effects on the Georgian state-building project were devastating. Altogether,
Georgia lost control over the Upper Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, Akhalgori district in South
Ossetia, as well as Georgian villages in other parts of South Ossetia, mainly in the Liakhvi
Gorge close to Tskhinval/i, which Georgian forces had controlled before the conflict. Following
Russia’s decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states in late August,
the Russian Federation pledged to station a total of approximately 3700 troops in each of the
two breakaway regions, suggesting that the ‘independence’ of the two enclaves would be strictly
circumscribed. For Georgia, the major consequence of the war was one that almost all
Georgians, both within the government and amongst the population at large, would continue
to deny: that neither South Ossetia nor Abkhazia will be returned to Georgian sovereignty in
the foreseeable future.
The ill-fated decision to intervene militarily in South Ossetia without due appraisal of the
potential consequences reflects a lack of institutionalization of the decision-making process
and a legacy of arbitrary rule that dates back to the Soviet period. All key decisions were
taken by a narrow circle of Saakashvili’s close associates, who were unrestrained by any mech-
anism of oversight or any effective opposition. The government, in order to maintain its grip on
power, sought to portray the domestic opposition as pro-Russian and therefore traitors to their
homeland.16 In turn, opposition politicians were forced to play the same game by showing
that they were even more ‘patriotic’, more anti-Russian and more forceful in their desire to
reintegrate Georgia than the government. This left no space for a moderate discourse that
would promote negotiation and compromise.
Alongside its drive to bring back the two breakaway enclaves, the Saakashvili administration
also pledged to integrate national minorities as full citizens of Georgia. There was a new
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emphasis on ‘civic nationalism’, based on the notion that all citizens, irrespective of their nation-
ality, have the right to participate fully in public life. However, this policy led to fears amongst
some members of national minorities that what the Georgian government really had in mind was
forced assimilation of minorities.
During the Saakashvili administration, the following trends have been observed with respect
to the integration of national minorities: greater emphasis on teaching Georgian in schools where
national minorities are concentrated, often with the assistance of international donors such as the
OSCE; promises to improve the basic infrastructure in areas where national minorities are con-
centrated, including a promise to rehabilitate the roads linking Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda to
other Georgian cities with the help of the US-funded Millennium Challenge Grant; the establish-
ment of a school of public administration, named after the late prime minister Zurab Zhvania,
aimed to recruit members of national minorities to work in the civil service; the establishment
of youth camps called ‘patriot camps’ aimed to bring together young people from different
ethnic backgrounds; and the ratification of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities, which came into force in December 2005.
However, within this new policy direction, certain assimilationist tendencies can be
observed. If we look at the markers of this new ‘civic’ identity, the main one is the Georgian
language, which is to serve as the basis for national integration. While this can be seen as a prac-
tical step that is based on the necessity of establishing a lingua franca for all nationalities of
Georgia to replace Russian, which served that role during the Soviet period, language is never-
theless laden with symbolism and is seen as closely tied to notions of nation and nationhood.
Moreover, looking at some of the rhetoric from the Georgian leadership, it is hard to escape
the conclusion that the cultural markers that are to define the new ‘civic’ Georgia are to be pre-
dominantly ethnically Georgian. Here a speech delivered by Mikheil Saakashvili at the congress
of his party, the National Movement, on 22 November 2004 to celebrate the first anniversary of
the Rose Revolution is illustrative:
True heroes are Shorena [a young teacher who addressed the conference earlier] and hundreds of
other young idealists like her, remarkable people for whom their homeland is more than simply
empty words and drum-beating . . . This is her daily work. . . . She gets up at six o’clock and
takes four different buses to go from Tbilisi to Sadakhlo [a place with a large ethnic Azerbaijani
population]. She spends more than half her salary on these buses, so that she can teach not just
the Georgian language, but also Georgian national consciousness. These are the kind of people
who are building the new Georgia.17
This new emphasis on nation-building by ‘teaching Georgian national consciousness’ alarmed
some representatives of national minorities who feared cultural assimilation. In particular,
they objected to provisions in the new Bill on General Education, passed in 2005, which required
Georgian language and literature, the history and geography of Georgia as well as ‘other social
sciences’ to be taught in Georgian as part of the national curriculum by the academic year 2010–
2011 at the latest. They objected not only because of the short time-scale, which many believed
to be unrealistic due to the low level of competence in Georgian of many members of national
minorities, but also because they feared that the new curriculum would deprive their children of
the opportunity to learn about the culture and history of their own people. Instead, they would be
forced to learn the highly contested official historiography of the Georgian nation. Although
schools for national minorities would still have the right to teach the minority language,
history and culture as specialist subjects outside the national curriculum, the fear remained
that the long-term goal of the new government was to turn members of national minorities
into Georgians.18
Despite the new emphasis on ‘civic nationalism’ and despite the passage of 15 years since
Georgia acquired independence, historical discourses that emphasize (ethnic) Georgians’
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unique claim to indigenousness and that gave priority to Georgian cultural symbols still
prevailed. In particular, arguments over which groups were indigenous to Georgia still
clouded the debate over the language issue. Thus, leading government officials and parliamen-
tarians frequently argue that while Abkhazian may be recognized as a second state language on
the territory of Abhkazia because it is an autochthonous language and is not used in any other
‘kin state’, Armenian, Azerbaijani and Ossetian, fulfilling neither of these criteria, could not
be given such status (Korth et al. 2005).
As well as the motivation behind the new policy, questions have also been raised about its
effectiveness. According to a survey carried out by the National Integration and Tolerance in
Georgia Program (NITG) at the end of 2006, in Samtskhe-Javakheti and in Kvemo Kartli,
respectively only 24.6% and 16.9% of inhabitants who belong to national minorities say they
speak Georgian. Most members of minorities who speak Georgian in Samtskhe-Javakheti
almost certainly live in the ethnically mixed Akhaltsikhe district. The number of Georgian-
speaking minority inhabitants who speak the language in the largely mono-ethnic Armenian dis-
tricts of Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda is likely to be much lower. More worryingly, perhaps,
amongst those inhabitants between 18 and 25 years of age the corresponding figures are
15.1% and 14.1% respectively, showing that efforts to improve instruction in Georgian in
recent years have been barely effective.19
The language barrier has prevented many members of ethnic minorities from entering state
administration or even state universities. Language legislation to ensure that public servants had
knowledge of Georgian – conveniently ignored during the Shevardnadze presidency – was
enforced more enthusiastically after the Rose Revolution. There were isolated incidents in Java-
kheti of existing (Armenian) staff being replaced by Georgians in the Notary’s Office and in the
local office of the Ministry of Justice on the grounds that they were unable to speak the state
language.20 Increasingly, language tests and appraisals for civil servants were required to gain
positions in various professions. Although these tests and appraisals had already been introduced
during the Shevardnadze period, they had not been enforced.
These practices led to an under-representation of minorities in public life. According to the
above-mentioned survey, only 4% (1222 employees) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
only six out of 261 judges belonged to national minorities.21 Minorities were also under-
represented in political life; in the 2004–2008 parliament only nine out of 225 MPs belonged
to national minorities, and this number fell to six after the 2008 parliamentary elections,
although the total number of MPs was also reduced to 150. This is lower even than during
the Shevardnadze period; in the 1999–2004 parliament there were 14 members of national
minorities.
Finally, minorities concentrated in rural areas remain ignorant of the political developments
of the country, mainly because they cannot understand news broadcasts in Georgian. A survey
carried out by the European Centre for Minority Issues in 13 rural districts in the provinces of
Kakheti, Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti a few days before the parliamentary elections of
May 2008 showed that, on average, ethnic Georgian respondents could identify 4.01 of the 12
parties and blocs that were competing in the elections, while members of ethnic minorities
identified only 1.93 parties and blocs on average. The difference was highly statistically
significant (on a Welch Two Sample t-test, t ¼ 23.55, df ¼ 1051.64, p , 2.2e-16).
Like the state-building project, the success of Mikheil Saakashvili’s drive to integrate
national minorities into public life ran into serious difficulties. First, the ‘civic’ notion of the
Georgian nation was hard to distinguish from the ethnic concept, a distinction that has eluded
Georgian nation-builders since the Soviet period. As a result, the drive was met with resistance
by certain minority groups that feared assimilation. Second, the implementation of the project
was ineffective and few tangible results could be observed.
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Conclusion
The internal conflicts that engulfed Georgia at independence and remain unresolved today are, in
part at least, a legacy of the Soviet Union. The ethnofederal structure of the USSR and the way
the ‘nation’ was conceived during the Soviet period made it almost impossible for the new state
first to function effectively and to create a ‘national community’ with which all citizens could
identify. Moreover, as a result of the chaos that engulfed the country in the early 1990s, the Geor-
gian state was unable to exercise the core functions that modern democratic states are supposed
to provide. At the same time, state power did not become institutionalized; instead key decisions
were the result of arbitrary decision making by the president and his inner circle. This too
appears to be a legacy of the Soviet tendency towards arbitrary rule by the Party leadership.
Under such circumstances, it proved hard for the new state to establish meaningful links with
its citizens, to foster the development of a ‘demos’ or national community with shared values
and to persuade citizens to identify with the new state.
Following the Rose Revolution in 2003, serious efforts were made to consolidate the auth-
ority of the Georgian state, and this included a drive to reintegrate the breakaway regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The state-building drive achieved a degree of success, especially
in terms of increasing the extractive capacity of the state and improving the delivery of public
goods, even in remote rural areas in which national minorities were concentrated. However, the
failure of the leadership to establish reliable democratic institutions and its preference for arbi-
trary decision making led to the decision to use the military as the main means of restoring ter-
ritorial integrity. This would prove to be an abject failure.
Notes
1. See, for example von Herder (1969).
2. Lortkipanidze argues that the Apsilae and Abasgoi, mentioned by classical writers of the first and
second centuries AD as inhabiting the area that today is Abkhazia, were not the ancestors of the
modern Abkhazians, but were instead Kartvelians (Georgians). Therefore, she argues that it is
Georgians, not Abkhazians, that are the autochthonous population of Abkhazia. Such discourse had
already appeared in Georgian historiography in the 1950s; a much-cited 1954 publication by Georgian
historian Pavle Ingoroqva championed the notion that the Abkhazian community was not native to the
region. President Gamsakhurdia, on the other hand, eventually came to recognize the Abkhazians as
autochthonous
3. Five months after the massacre, an opinion poll indicated that 89% of Georgians supported Georgian
independence. This compares with 64% of Estonians in August 1989 and 55% of Latvians in June 1989
(Beissinger 2002, p. 177).
4. The First Secretary of the Communist Party provincial committee (obkom) of Abkhazia was
Abkhazian, and even in 1978, 39.4% of obkom members, 37.5% of city and district first secretaries
and 45% of heads of Party departments at province district and city level were also Abkhazian
(Cvetkovski). These figures are likely to have been even higher in the 1980s after Moscow’s further
concessions. Another estimate indicates that 41% of members of the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet
and 67% of republican ministers belonged to the (Abkhazian) titular nationality (Tsikhelashvili).
5. For the most part, Georgian place names end with an ‘i’, whilst neither Abkhazian nor Ossetian place
names do so. Throughout this article both forms of spelling will be indicated.
6. A major outbreak of violence in Abkhazia did occur in May 1998, when Abkhazian military units
swept into the predominantly Georgian district of Gal/i and expelled most of the Georgian population
living there.
7. See Julie A. George’s article in this issue for further details.
8. The Armenian population of Javakheti frequently refers to what they term the ‘Armenian genocide’,
i.e. the large-scale massacre of Armenians by Turkish Ottoman troops during the First World War.
9. IMF data. See http://www.imf.org/external/country/GEO/index.htm.
10. Ibid.
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11. For example, these included Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria, Tbilisi Mayor Gigi Ugulava, Head
of the National Security Council, Kakha Lomaia, Justice Minister, Zurab Adeishvili, the Head of the
Parliamentary Committee on Security and Defence, Givi Tagamadze, Targamadze’s Deputy, Nikoloz
Rurua, and Minister of Internal Affairs, Vano Merabishvili. Most of these individuals were part of a
network of former NGO activists who helped to mastermind the Rose Revolution.
12. Civil Georgia: Online Magazine (18 March 2008). Available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.
php?id¼17380 [Accessed 21 January 2009].
13. Georgia’s main goal was to join NATO. Although NATO refused Georgia a Membership Action Plan
(MAP) in April and again in December 2008, they passed a declaration expressing the conviction that
Georgia would become a NATO member at some time in the future. This infuriated Russia.
14. In May, Russia troops were sent into Abkhazia to restore a railway from Sukhum/Sokhumi to the
Ochamchire region. During the August war the railway was used to transport Russian soldiers into
Abkhazia. Moreover, according to the International Crisis Group (2008), local sources in South
Ossetia reported that in late July Russian advisers and military officers arrived in the town of Java
and hired local workers to help construct military buildings there.
15. Including Irakli Alasania, who claimed that the August crisis ‘was caused by unilateral, chaotic, non-
institutional process of decision-making on vital issues and absence of transparent system of govern-
ance’. Civil Georgia: Online Magazine, 24 December 2008. Available from: http://www.civil.ge/
eng/article.php?id¼20191.
16. After mass opposition protests in the autumn 2007 precipitated the declaration on a state of emergency
on 7 November, the government-controlled media produced highly questionable evidence that
appeared to link a number of opposition leaders with Russian intelligence.
17. BBC International Reports (Former Soviet Union) 22 November 2004. Original Source: Imedi TV,
Tbilisi, in Georgian 1200 GMT, 22 November 2004.
18. Source: Interviews with the author; ‘24 Hours’ online newspaper No. 231 (60), 6 April 2005; Inter-
national War and Peace Reporting, Caucasus Reporting Service, No. 282, 14 April 2005. Available
from: http://www.iwpr.net.
19. National Integration and Tolerance in Georgia. Available from: http://www.diversity.ge/files/files/
ASR/NITG_Assesment_survey_report_Report.pdf [Accessed 21 January 2009].
20. Source: Interviews with the author.
21. National Integration and Tolerance in Georgia.
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